Security Threat Groups

Jess Maghan, Ph.D.

Ironic as it may seem, it is now safe to say that prison gang oversight is becoming as sophisticated as the gangs themselves. The national (and international) intelligence sharing, technological surveillance, officer training programs, emergency preparedness, interagency cooperation, research and evaluation of Security Threat Groups* (gangs) in the prison environment has emerged as a priority custodial operations and security component of modern correctional services. Current security and custody jargon refers to the prison gang problem as Security Threat Groups (STGs).

Anti-gang policies and procedures have moved to the forefront of institutional security priorities. The U.S. Bureau of Justice Administration's (BJA) now provides information related to prison gangs, gang members, and prison gang activities through its Regional Information Sharing System (RISS).3 It also provides technical assistance and training on a national basis to correctional agencies and allied law enforcement personnel. This network is evolving into a formal system for the sharing of gang intelligence data and strategies.

However, these STG control efforts must be carefully construed. One of the strongest objections to enhancing the institutional focus on frequent, violent offenders is that the present system is already sharply focused. If correctional agencies are already concentrating on the most dangerous offenders, it will do little good and conceivably some harm to urge still greater concentration. The safety and security of those inmates who seek to do their time and cooperated with institutional programs are jeopardized in the process of overarching efforts solely focused on controlling inmate gangs. The ability for non-gang inmates to avoid gang involvement is becoming less tenable. This population of inmates is seriously in need of primary focus. They, along with the correctional officers, are increasingly forced to survive within a security regime designed solely to control gang-bangers and troublemakers.

Chart II: Summary Findings - Prisoners in 1995

Chart II Summary Findings State Prisoners Incarcerated for a Violent Offense In 1995, an estimated 46% of State prison inmates were incarcerated for a violent offense.

1995 Percent of Most Serious Offense Inmates in State Prison

Total 100%
Violent Offense 46
Property Offense 24
Drug Offenses 23
Public-order offense 7
Other/unspecified 1

* Among sentenced Federal inmates in 1995, an estimated 60% were serving a sentence for a drug offense.

Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, June 1997 Note: A sharp rise in violent offenders among white inmates (accounting for 42% of the 10-year increase in white prisoners) and in drug offenders for black inmates (42% of their increase) for 1996.

On the extreme side the gang rules of the street now apply to the correction facility. The mentality of the gang "drive-by execution" has become manifest behind the walls of our correctional facilities. Gangs flourish in prisons for protection purposes, just as gangs flourish in the street for social reasons of turf and protection. Just as gang leaders may "police" neighborhood turf these strategies often erupt into assassinations. Inmates and staff are murdered and mutilated on "orders" from prison gang leaders.

In many ways, the confinement itself makes the gang leader more "visible," providing anti-hero status. Ironically, incarceration contrasts with the usual fugitive and furtive existence of living in the shadows, one step ahead of the police or FBI. Imprisonment can become a time for reunion and reconnecting with family, friends, and associates that were too precarious to manage in the gang-turf environs of the streets.1 In this context, incarceration is seen as an opportunity to learn new skills, share information, gain alliances, settle old feuds, begin new ones. Gang loyalty in some prisons is so fierce that inmates are willing to risk prolonging their sentences or losing their lives to comply with gang orders.

As a result, a new sophisticated inmate code has emerged that now more closely follows racial and cultural boundaries but includes also a virile capacity for collaborative violence in sustaining control over the illicit inmate economy and respective gang turf. According to the New York State Department of Correctional Services Guidelines (1988), an inmate is classified maximum security if he falls into any of the following categories:

sophistication of crimes and criminal history
patterns of impulsive serious violence
pattern of serious callous violence
violence against authority
vicious serious violence
arson
sex crimes
group gang membership
nomad (history of moving between cities and states)
aggressive homosexual
suicidal, or
psychological instability.

Reclassification upwards (to a higher security prison) may depend upon a prediction of dangerousness that follows an episode of violence (or escape attempt) or even a series of non-violent rule-violating behaviors.2

Connecticut, California, and Michigan have developed several of the more sophisticated strategies for gang control, including telephone call monitoring, canine teams, and increased collaboration with law enforcement agencies.3 The following case-study of the Connecticut anti-gang PHASE Program provides an excellent model for managing the new generation inmate.

Connecticut: A Case Study

In 1990, the Connecticut Department of correction was experiencing a proliferation of organized gangs and violence within the state's correctional facilities. As a result, in 1991, the Department of Correction formally established a gang management unit. The employees assigned to this unit along with designated staff at each of the state's correctional facilities began to gather information on gangs and monitor and investigate all gang activities. By the beginning of 1992 an agency-wide policy was developed to both monitor and control gangs and gang members. This policy established a system for formally designating a security risk group (gang), and individual inmates as security risk group members.

The following disincentives and restrictions were established for inmates that were designated as a member of a security risk group:

Not eligible for placement in a minimum security prison

Not allowed to have a home furlough

Not allowed an overnight family visit

Not allowed to work outside the prisons secure perimeter

Not eligible for having any lost good time restored

Not allowed to work in a prison industry program

Increased sanctions for any disciplinary infractions

Despite these initiatives gang activities and violence continued to escalate within the prison system. In late 1993 and early 1994, the department established two new prison programs, one for those inmates that were designated as security risk group members and displaying violent behavior, (or were security risk group leaders) and the other for any inmate that assaulted a staff member. Both programs require the identified inmates to be placed in a high security housing unit that operates a specialized management program.

The first phase of each program is very restrictive with inmates that demonstrate appropriate behavior and program participation being able to progress through and ultimately out of the program. Criteria for program advancement is based on the inmates effort, attitude, behavior and graded achievement, with a corresponding increase in privileges and responsibility as the inmate moves through the system.

It was felt that traditional policies of segregating inmates that were prone to violence without program intervention, or without a structured release program had not proven successful in reducing violent behavior within the prison system. Although the specific restrictions, privileges, and programs are different in the gang management units and the assaultive inmate units, each established a "PHASE" model consisting of three levels.

Gang Management Program

PHASE I encourages rudimentary disciplines while gauging inmates in program adaptability and attitude. Cross-cultural sensitization is taught encouraging inmates to live and work together harmoniously. During the PHASE I process, inmates are reviewed by the unit team for progression into PHASE II. Before acceptance into PHASE II, inmates are required to sign a Letter of Intent stating their intention to renounce any and all gang affiliations upon completion of the PHASE Program.

PHASE II develops socialization skills while delving into educational, management, and awareness programming. Programs are presented providing an understanding of social delineation's and divisions and how to recognize and prevent them. This philosophy is incorporated into a program of understanding, awareness, and alternatives to "gang" membership.

Upon acceptance into PHASE II, inmates are grouped into "squads" consisting of twelve (12) inmates of differing gang affiliations with no more than four of the same affiliation in each squad. Furthermore inmates are required to have a cell partner from a rival gang. All activities and daily events take place as a "squad." Inmates are required to attend a week-long orientation program designed to familiarize them with the program and to allow staff to insure their appropriateness for continued participation. Inmates must continue to meet the expectations of PHASE I and PHASE II to progress, and are continually evaluated and reviewed by the unit team for progression into PHASE III. The PHASE II portion of the program takes approximately 60 days to complete.

PHASE III continues the emphasis on programming by diversifying into anger and violence control forums. The cross-cultural sensitization continues to be taught in practical application through successful inmate-to-inmate interaction. The ability to channel aggressive feelings into positive modes with real resolutions and expectations is explored.

The intended product of PHASE III is a culturally-adapted and socially-appropriate individual, capable of dealing successfully with the pressure of incarceration and gang affiliations. Interactive and interpersonal skills are taught to help inmates live together without violence. The PHASE III portion of the program can be completed in approximately 90 days. Through each of the phases inmate behavior, compliance with programming, and continued gang affiliation or activity is monitored.

Ultimately, if the inmate is unable to progress through the phases and remains in PHASE I for a period of a year, placement in the more restrictive Assaultive Inmate Management Program is considered. However, most inmates take advantage of the program and finally, upon successful completion of all three phases, and a formal renunciation of gang affiliation are reintegrated into general population at other facilities throughout the state.

Assaultive Inmate Management Program

PHASE I is designed to limit the inmate's acting out behavior making him amenable for programming in PHASE II and PHASE III. This phase is less restrictive than PHASE I with limited out-of-cell group programming. Programs dealing with criminality and self change, and effective communication are taught. The individual inmate is allowed to progress through each phase at his own pace and is held strictly accountable for his action.

The inmate in PHASE II may advance at his pace to the next phase, remain in the status quo or be returned to PHASE I if his behavior warrants.

PHASE III provides considerable out of cell programming and gives the inmate opportunities to learn methods to avoid assaultive behavior. This phase contains the final steps proper to an inmate being considered for release in general population. These steps include an intensive psycho educational programming model which each individual inmate must successfully complete. Programs dealing with anger management, violence reduction and relapse prevention are conducted.

Since their inception these programs have had a direct impact on reducing both the level of violence and gang activity throughout the Connecticut prison system. Less than six percent of the inmates that have completed the Assaultive Inmate Management Program have had to be returned to the program because of continued violent behavior. Through the development of these programs the Connecticut Department of Correction has had significant success in controlling and managing the violence prone new generation inmate. It is hoped that these programs will prove to be not only a behavior management program for inmates while they are in prison, but also a behavior change program for inmates when they return to their communities.

Custodial Management Implications

A violence-threat paradigm is emerging that influences inmate-inmate and inmate-officer interactions. Cellular telephones are now reported as a major new contraband item relative to prison gangs and their activities.4 Another example is found in the nefarious ways in which gangs obtain information on facility staff, work schedules, supplies, and materials.

Gang acquisition of personal car license plates, social security numbers, credit card numbers, and other information on institutional staff is linked to both internal and external sources. In some jurisdictions, it is not unusual for correctional officers to find themselves on duty in a cell block or in a dormitory that houses inmates from their own neighborhood in the free community. Close proximity between officers and prisoners creates a situation fraught with potential security and safety problems. Correctional officers, like police officers, are easy prey for extortionists.5

The trend is moving toward higher security with much more sophisticated technology and operating. Ultra-security architectural models are emerging for correctional custodial control. Consequently, an aggressive construction of "maxi-maxi" at the state level has occurred. For budgetary reasons, most of these institutions have been created by renovating existing prisons, lacking the architectural advantage of a purpose-built prisons such as the U.S. penitentiaries in Marion, Illinois and the new super-maximum Federal facility at Florence, Colorado.

Despite this security-conscious architecture and secure operating procedures, a great deal of violence continues to occur in maximum security prisons. This is hardly surprising given the violent proclivities of offenders who are forced to live together in these crowded and restricted conditions. In some instances, the very architecture and regime constructed to prevent violence has had a perverse violence-generating effect. For example, controlled movement and long periods of being locked up in cells may generate a great deal of tension and frustration. Indeed, all the signals that indicate that the inhabitants of these institutions are dangerous might set off something of a self-fulfilling prophesy, producing the very type of behavior that is unwanted. Severe overcrowding, institutional violence, racial tensions are significant symptoms of this crisis situation

Conclusion

The American correctional system already functions, to a large degree, as a surrogate public health system. The racial demographics of our prison population mirror deeper social problems, problems that correctional agencies increasingly are being asked to solve. Across the nation, state and federal penitentiaries exist as urban bubbles where city problems are custodially contained.6 If the city that feeds the prison has gangs on its streets, the prison has gangs on its blocks. If there is rampant drug use, drug dealing, and violence on the outside, these activities will ensue on the inside. The tasks of maintaining custody, security, and control in a humane and safe manner will become more challenging and difficult.

The recently completed collaborative research study between the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and the National Institute of Justice provides the first survey research evaluation of the effectiveness of custodial drug interdiction programs. Readers are invited to contact Pennsylvania Corrections Secretary Martin F. Horn for a copy of this significant survey research report. This drug interdiction program directly interfaces with efforts to oversight prison gangs.7

The magnitude of incarceration in the United States at the close of this century casts a shadow on our larger social infrastructure. This situation raises important questions about the purpose and scope of incarceration: questions that can only be answered by social programs and other resources outside of prisons. The current trend is toward higher security with more sophisticated technology and procedures.8 Current philosophies and techniques of unit management, direct supervision, and related operational methods for delivering services to inmates will assume even greater industrial and programmatic proportion.

Notes

1. J. Maghan, "Terrorism and Corrections: The Incarcerated Radical," in International Terrorism: The Decade Ahead. J.R. Buckwalter (Ed.), Chicago, IL: Office of International Criminal Justice, UIC,.(1985): 29-53.

2. J. Maghan, "Dangerous Inmates: Maximum Security Incarceration in the State Prison Systems of the United States." in Aggression and Violent Behavior, 4(1),(1998):1-12.

3. Midstates Organized Crime Information Center, Prison Gang Intelligence Program. Bureau of Justice Administration, U.S. Department of Justice, (1996), 1-5.

4. M.G. Wagner, (1996). Cel Phones Often Seized as Cell Phones. In Los Angeles Times, Orange County, Wednesday, May 29, 1996; Part A, 13.

5 J. Maghan, "The Correction Connection: Intelligence Gathering in Prisons." Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement, 3, no.3, (1995):548-557

6. J. Maghan, "Carcinogenic Corrections: Environmental Health Conditions Have a Direct Effect on the Working Conditions and Capacity of Correctional Employees." in The Keepers' Voice, 18(4): 18-26, with, James T. Garvey, Jr.; Reprinted: Crime and Justice International, 4(2): (1997):8-11, 31.

7 M. Horn, "NIJ Study Reveals Crackdown Has Made Pennsylvania Prisons Nearly 99 Percent Drug Free." NewsFront, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, Vol. XXIV(4):1,2 &10, Winter 1998.

8. J. Maghan, "Corrections Countdown: Prisoners at the Cusp of the 21st Century," in Prison and Jail Administration: Practice and Theory, Peter Carlson and Judith Simon Garrett (Eds), Gaithersburg, Md.: Aspen Publishers, (1998):197-214.

Jess Maghan, Professor and Director of The Forum for Comparative Correction, specializes in environmental health, institutional violence, and correctional and police officer occupational stress. Dr. Maghan serves on the national advisory board for the U.S. Department of Justice, (NIJ) project: Addressing Correctional Officer Stress: Programs and Strategies. He can be reached through International Association of Correctional Officers (IACO), Lincoln, Nebraska: 800-255 2382 or by email at jess.maghan@snet.net.