

## The Post-9/11 Prison

by Jess Maghan  
*Special to CJI*

Technically speaking, there is no American prison system<sup>1</sup>. Each state operates its own prison system for convicted felons. The rest of the criminal justice system is even more decentralized. Police are organized at the town or city level. Prosecutorial agencies and jails for pretrial confinement are organized at the county and city level. The federal government has its own criminal justice and prison system to deal with federal crimes.

Although the federal system, spread across the entire United States, is quite large in terms of the total volume of arrests, prosecutions, and incarcerations, it is not as large as, for example, California's criminal justice system.

Correctional agencies have minimal control over incarceration rates. As noncompetitive government agencies, correctional institutions do not compete for clients. Reporting from their respective jurisdictions to the executive branch of the government and functioning downstream from other components of the criminal justice system, public sector jails and prisons are essentially residual agencies.



The momentum of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, as epitomized by the 9/11 terrorist attack on the United States, calls attention to the need for coordination and sharing of information by state and federal criminal justice and correctional systems. This is especially significant in relation to the size and diversity of prison populations in the United States.

### Cybernetic Corrections

Technology will be at the heart of the strategy to make the nation more secure. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 showed that it is imperative to imagine the ways terrorists could disrupt the nation's information infrastructure, including computer networks that control telecommunications, the power grid, water supplies, and air traffic. In November 2001, the U.S. Attorney

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General ordered all federal justice agencies, including the Bureau of Prisons, to assess their intelligence analysis ca-



*San Quentin Prison (Above: East Block).*

pacities and emphasized to share information with state/local law enforcement agencies.

Two systems are tailored-made for this information sharing and are becoming commonplace in state and federal prisons. These are 1) Integrated Justice Information Systems and 2) Compstat-Teams (Total Efficient Accountability Management Systems). Integrated Justice Information Systems, particularly in the field of mobile operations and high-speed internet, are providing a wide range of justice-system functions, such as telemedicine, police line-ups, legal hearings, personnel clearances, and immediate contact for correctional facilities in rural and remote settings.

Compstat-Teams pool information and subject it to intense analysis, computer mapping, strategic response, and expanded information-gathering resources. Compstat-Teams are designed to sustain the collection of accurate data for measuring performance, policy, and procedures. Compstat-Teams have another purpose: accountability. Institutional managers and supervisors must be conversant in organizational development and capable of interpolating data with intelligence matters. Compstat-Teams is the central management accountability system of the New York City Department of Correction.

While information technology provides the bridge for networking and support of essential management information

systems, it is also vulnerable to illegal access (hacking and virus-sabotage) and the disruption and/or destruction of correctional management information and security systems. In June 2004, the Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security reported that DHS had not yet established security measures to protect its wireless networks and devices. As such, the report concluded that DHS cannot ensure that its sensitive information about terrorist threats and security is not being monitored, accessed, and misused.<sup>2</sup>

Cell phones, once a simple annoyance in public, are now a growing problem in prisons and jails. Cell phones are becoming the newest form of coveted contraband, allowing inmates to communicate freely with the outside world and, at times, conduct illicit activity from behind bars. It is not inconceivable that inmates will be smuggling in Palm Pilots containing built-in cellular phones, thus giving them access to the Internet as well. Keeping pace with a high-tech, wireless world is now a correctional operations priority.

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Islamic extremists have infiltrated prison facilities worldwide to lure convicts to their murderous cause. The problem is thought to be much worse in Europe than in the U.S. For example, Richard Reid, the "Shoe Bomber," converted to Islam with the help of an extremist inmate in a British prison. In France, thousands of Muslim inmates have been schooled in Jihad against "the Western powers and the Jews who manipulate them," as one widely circulated prison pamphlet puts it. Radicalized French detainees have reportedly erected a "terrorist university" behind bars offering anti-Western material and instruction in bomb-making.<sup>3</sup>

According to the FBI, it is likely that terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda will attempt to radicalize and recruit inmates in the United States. FBI counterterrorism officials stated that inmates are logical targets for terrorist recruitment because they may be predisposed to violence, feel disenfranchised from society, desire power and influence, seek revenge against those who incarcerated them, be hostile towards authority and the United States, or cling to a radical or extremist Islamic "family." Prisons also have large populations of non-Arab Muslim inmates who are increasingly valuable for terrorism recruitment, since they may not receive the same level of scrutiny as Middle Eastern Muslims.

The Justice Department's Inspector General released a report in April 2004<sup>4</sup> documenting federal prisons as a fertile breeding ground for terrorists. It was a red alert on a bureaucratic failure that jeopardizes not only other inmates and prison employees, but also the country at large. The BOP's 105 facilities hold

150,000 inmates (6 to 17 percent of them Muslim), just a fraction of the total U.S. prison population of 2 million. To date, there is no coordinated report on the impact of al-Qaeda among the much larger population in the 50 state correctional systems.

Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, a top Osama bin Laden aide held in connection with the 1998 bombing of U.S. Embassies, was sentenced to 32 years in federal prison in May 2004 for the 2000 stabbing of a federal corrections officer in the eye with a comb sharpened into a knife. Salim was assisted by his cellmate, Embassy bomber Khalfan Khamis Mohamed. Several convicted terrorists – Richard Reid, Ramzi Yousef, Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, and Abouhalima – have now been separated from the federal prison population and locked up at the "Supermax" facility in Florence, Colorado.

Certain inmates are intuitively-skilled at obtaining personal data on institutional staff, such as work schedules, personal vehicle license plates, social security and credit card numbers. Inmates have always been adept at obtaining intrinsic-institutional information, such as inventory of sensitive supplies of drugs and medicine, dangerous materials, chemicals and fertilizer. Inmates exploit phone, mail, visiting, and other institutional privileges. It is always in the routine of ordinary prison operations that inmates contrive situations for sabotage of facility infrastructure or incite incidents of violence against staff or other inmates, create disturbances and riots, and orchestrate escapes.

These inmates continually probe the correctional system for weaknesses. They are most often model inmates. They are skilled at compromising officers and wardens and are very effective at lulling a system into a false sense of security. They are very adept at gaining intelligence through establishing a good relationship with correctional officers. These inmates believe that "time is on their side." They feel that they can always wait to be sure they are in control of the time, place, and circumstances of their escape and disruption tactics. In response, correctional agencies and their law enforcement colleagues must take full control of such confrontations. It is important for police personnel to understand that these inmates coordinate escapes with outside groups. These inmates are willing to kill anyone who tries to intervene.<sup>5</sup> Thus, key correctional-custodial functions provide continuity for intelligence collaboration. The areas most often targeted by inmates for illicit activities are as follows:

- **LEGAL VISITS** – Often the people who make decisions about what documents can be released (discovery) have no idea of the value of these documents (facility architectural plans).

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
- **POPULATION MANAGEMENT** – Sub-Rosa communication networks abound in prison. It is difficult to preclude inmate-inmate communications both inside/outside of correctional facilities. The task: use their ability to communicate to our advantage (e.g. monitor inmate fund disbursements to determine affiliations, mutual associations, and extortion pattern/product use).
- **INTELLIGENCE GATHERING** – The vulnerability of the physical plant, the regimentation of daily schedules, and the interaction of all people in a prison (staff, officers, inmates) can become important intelligence sources. The investigations of institutional crimes are difficult. Inmates are reluctant to testify and their credibility is easy to attack. Their “safety” imperiled. Prosecutors are reluctant to get involved in prison cases.
- **COMMUNICATION NETWORKS** – Correctional officers are vulnerable. Charismatic inmates systematically and continuously work to manipulate the human frailties of officers. For these inmates, their conversations and actions always have a purpose...testing and setting-up situations to serve their needs.
- **GENERAL OPERATIONS ISSUES** –The transportation fleet, vehicle control and deployment system (routes), vulnerable hospital, clinic, and special housing units -- have become sensitive and potential access spots for infiltration, information, and (attack).
- **SECURITY/CUSTODY ISSUES** - Prison officers now report incidents of inmates short-circuiting the entire high-tech locking systems between a door and the electric jamb. For the inmates, jamming the institutional computerized security system is considered a highly prized sabotage attack. Often in these situations, assigned staff could not remember the emergency operational training and manual guidelines required to rectify the crisis.
- **ESCAPE ATTEMPTS** – Certain inmates continually probe the correctional system for weaknesses. These inmates are more often model inmates. They are very adept at gaining “intelligence” through establishing a “good” relationship with officers and staff.

## Trends

Incarceration trends amplify the prison system’s social and legal complexities. The growth of the prison population is a result of many factors, including the nation’s crime policies (e.g. crack cocaine and related drug offense penalties). The primary factor producing these increases is the enactment of mandatory sentencing legislation in all 50 states, with Congress deeming incarceration the predominant approach to deter potential offenders and incapacitate convicted criminals, especially in “get tough” mandatory minimum sentences for repeat offenders.


Figure 1, illustrates the aggregate number of inmates at mid-year 2003 as 2,078,570 in the prisons and jails of the United States.<sup>6</sup> Inmates in the custody of the 50 states and the Federal Government accounted for two-thirds of the incarcerated population (1,380,776 inmates).

**Figure 1: U.S. Prison/Jail Population, Mid-year 2003**



A matter of further concern is the racial and ethnic component of these incarceration rates. Figure 2 illustrates the ethnic and racial composition of this incarcerated population.

**Figure 2: Ethnic and Racial Composition of Inmates, Mid-year 2003**



Recidivism, a dilemma that continues to evade innovative efforts to stop it, has become a primary factor in the analysis of incarceration rates. Recidivism has been characterized as a built-in feature of the criminal justice system. Be it offenders returning with past custodial sentences or while still on parole, the facts indicate that correctional services are increasingly admitting, processing, and managing past clients of the system.<sup>7</sup> Conditional release returns in Canadian prisons have doubled in the past 20 years, and close to 25 percent of all admissions to prisons in Canada<sup>8</sup> and the United States are returns to custody following the technical breach of release conditions.

For the correctional administrator, overcrowding represents a barrier to meeting their professional mandates and to serving the public by processing and protecting inmates as stipulated by the courts.

The re-emergence of the private-for-profit incarceration industry has increased the capacity for incarceration in the United States. The private prison business has become one of the most rapidly growing new industries in the United States. While a wide range of problems associated with correctional privatization exists, new public—private partnerships are emerging and becoming integrated as operational functions within public correctional systems, particularly in the area of health and food services, transportation, inmate life-skills training, and basic education programs.

### Institutional Implications

Some inmates cannot inhibit their impulses even when it is in their advantage to do so. Other inmates perceive an advantage in acting tough and violently. Much of the reputation-building that inmates engage in entails violence toward other inmates. Psychologically, self-esteem may be enhanced in peer groups and victimization neutralized into fights and assaults may be precipitated by the need for some degree of personal autonomy and reactions against the authority of the prison. As prisons fill to capacity and beyond, constraints on behavior increase, and inmates may react angrily (and calculatedly) against infringements on their space and circumscribed autonomy. In addition, a great deal of violence in American prisons is gang related or involves competition for control of illicit goods and services such as drugs, sex, and alcohol (Jacobs, 1974).<sup>9</sup>

In recent years, nearly all of the fifty states have constructed Supermax prisons or high security housing units (SHU). For budgetary reasons, many of these institutions were created by renovating existing prisons and, therefore, do not have the architectural advantages of a purpose-built institution like the ultra-maximum security federal correctional center at Florence, Colorado.

Dangerous inmates are also dealt with by transfer to specially designated administrative segregation units within maximum security prisons. Offenders perceived to be the most dangerous are assigned to maximum security and even to super-maximum security environments. The typical maximum security prison, like San Quentin (California), and Attica (New York) are well known around the world through depictions in American movies. They are characterized by high walls to prevent escape, gun towers where officers armed with rifles keep a close watch on activities in the open spaces below, and large cell blocks with barred cells where inmates are locked in when not working or eating. All movement is controlled; movement into and out of the cell house is monitored by metal detectors, movement sensors, and video surveillance.

Cell searches (for weapons and drugs) are routine, and strip searches are carried out whenever the inmate has a visitor. This comprehensive and intense security is very expensive, both in terms of hardware and staffing. Beds, toilets, sinks, and light structures are designed and constructed out of special material so that they cannot be destroyed. The staff in such institutions is trained to anticipate, cope with, and respond to individual and collective violence. Officers are equipped with body alarms and each institution maintains in readiness a full-time emergency response unit (with high-tech equip-



*Colorado State Prison*

ment). Weapons, including tear gas, are stockpiled strategically throughout the prison in readiness.

### Institutional Violence

Inmate violence is multidimensional. It involves inmate-on-inmate assaults (including rape) and group conflict. Group conflict can erupt in large-scale conflicts (inter-gang or inter-racial) or it can manifest itself in individual acts of violence by members of one group against members of another over an extended time period. Palermo, et al,<sup>10</sup> describes prison overcrowding as a situation that “breeds criminality by contiguity.” Moreover, inmate hostility is also manifested against institutional property, including the disruption of institutional operations, such as sabotage of institutional functions, food service, plumbing and automatic cell-locking devices.

Inmates define themselves, and are defined by, prison officials in terms of age, race, dangerousness, gang affiliation, and past incidents of institutional violence. Architecture, technology, staffing, training, security, and operating procedures are geared toward preventing violence and, if that fails, toward identifying, punishing, and further incapacitating dangerous inmates. As previously noted, the areas of an institution prone to violence require custodial oversight.


The results of a study by Woolredge<sup>11</sup> suggest that inmates who spend more time each week watching television are more likely to commit property crimes and to be victims of personal

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crimes: television watching is usually less directly supervised than “other forms of recreation.” Woolredge also found that inmates who do not receive regular visitors are significantly more likely to commit property crimes. Policies for reducing inmate victimization require a knowledge of inmates and their lifestyles (pre-institutional and institutional), which can influence their likelihood of both committing crime and being victimized during incarceration. Figure 3 illustrates the occurrence of institutional violence for 2002.<sup>12</sup>

**Figure 3: Institutional Violence, 2002**



Quite simply, today’s prisons and jails are more dangerous because of the unpredictability of the inmate population, which is composed of a new and highly distilled group of inmates. This new generation of inmates is younger, uneducated (illiterate or sub-literate), unemployed (unemployable), less afraid of punishment, and, increasingly, members of minority groups. This population is also more alienated, more violent, and more difficult to manage. These inmates are more likely to be substance abuse offenders and drug addicts. They are less healthy both physically and emotionally. They tend to be:

- Tattooed
- Unhealthy (10 years older than physical age)
- Carriers of sexually transmitted diseases, HIV or TB
- Emotional, spontaneous, hedonistic
- Violent predators
- Gang affiliated
- Children having children
- Unmarried
- Welfare clients
- Products of single-parent homes (usually Matriarchal)

### The Prison Gang – Security Threat Group

The infiltration of gangs into the prison environment is widespread. Gang culture has severely altered the traditional sense

of security in correctional facilities, including juvenile facilities and adult women’s prisons. Inmates are finding it harder to avoid gang involvement. These gangs are interracial networks organized around violence and criminal activity. Anti-gang policies and procedures have moved to the forefront of institutional security priorities. The U.S. Bureau of Justice Assistance now provides information related to prison gangs through its Regional Information Sharing System. It also provides nationwide technical assistance and training to correctional agencies and allied law enforcement personnel. This network is beginning to reap success through the sharing of gang intelligence data and strategies. The Connecticut Department of Correction operates an exemplary Gang Control Program, which incorporates the newly mandated collaboration with law enforcement and allied justice agencies.

The employees assigned to this unit along with designated staff at each of the state’s correctional facilities gather information on gangs and monitor and investigate all gang activities. The following *disincentives* and restrictions were established for inmates that were designated as a member of a security risk group:

- Not eligible for placement in a minimum security prison
- Not allowed to have a home furlough
- Not allowed an overnight family visit
- Not allowed to work outside the prison’s secure perimeter
- Not eligible for having any lost good time restored
- Not allowed to work in a prison industry program
- Increased sanctions for any disciplinary infractions

The first phase is very restrictive with inmates that demonstrate appropriate behavior and program participation being able to progress through and ultimately out of the program. Criteria for program advancement is based on the inmate’s effort, attitude, behavior and graded achievement, with a corresponding increase in privileges and responsibility as the inmate moves through the system.

### Custodial Control

Accurate, aggressive and highly flexible inmate classification is crucial to institutional safety and inmate welfare. According to the New York Department of Correctional Services Guidelines<sup>13</sup>, an inmate is classified as maximum security if he or she falls into one of the following categories:

- Sophisticated level of crimes and criminal history
- Pattern of impulsive, serious violence
- Pattern of serious callous violence
- History of violence against authority
- History of vicious, serious violence
- History of arson
- History of sex crimes
- Group gang membership
- History of moving between cities and states

- History of suicide attempts
- History of psychological instability

[Note: These categories are generic and meet most state and federal prison parameters for maximum security classification.]

## The Physical Plant

The built-environment of today's correctional facilities has undergone massive changes. An aggressive retrofitting-construction industry providing inflated sprung structures, tents, and trailers has emerged in response to the needs of the overcrowded prison market. Most of these structures meet only minimum standards for basic infrastructure security. These include retrofitted traditional security cellblocks changed into open dormitory housing. In some cases, these changes in physical plant usage obscure the appropriate security classification rationale for medium- and maximum-security risk inmates. Some correctional agencies are resorting to a wide range of jerry-built solutions (e.g. janitor closets and chapels converted to cells; gymnasiums, public areas of cellblocks, and day rooms converted into dormi-

tory housing; overcrowding has also resulted in the redeployment and use of structures not designed to be prisons (chapels, hospitals, schools, and staff training academies).

## Workforce Implications

The fact that correctional officers are locked in and unarmed as they maintain daily custodial control is perceived only as an occupational responsibility. The simple fact that correctional officers cannot walk away from a confrontation or crisis within the institutional setting is often overlooked. The deployment of correctional officers, including the proper mix of new and seasoned officers is of paramount importance.

Correctional officers are also experiencing a growing sense of insecurity in their working environment. In this context, custodial control is not unlike the current initiatives to reinvent law enforcement through community policing programs that enable both officers and inmates to perceive the mutuality of their safety concerns. Interpersonal communication skills have become the

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## Connecticut Gang Management Program

**P**HASE I encourages rudimentary disciplines while gauging inmates in program adaptability and attitude. Cross-cultural sensitization is taught encouraging inmates to live and work together harmoniously. During the PHASE I process, inmates are reviewed by the unit team for progression into PHASE II. Before acceptance into PHASE II, inmates are required to sign a *Letter of Intent* stating their intention to renounce any and all gang affiliations upon completion of the PHASE Program.

PHASE II develops socialization skills while delving into educational, management, and awareness programming. Programs are presented providing an understanding of social delineation's and divisions and how to recognize and prevent them. This philosophy is incorporated into a program of understanding, awareness, and alternatives to "gang" membership.

Upon acceptance into PHASE II, inmates are grouped into "squads" consisting of twelve (12) inmates of differing gang affiliations with no more than four of the same affiliation in each

squad. Furthermore, inmates are required to have a cell partner from a rival gang. All activities and daily events take place as a "squad." Inmates are required to attend a week-long orientation program designed to familiarize them with the program and to allow staff to insure their appropriateness for continued participation. Inmates must continue to meet the expectations of PHASE I and PHASE II to progress and are continually evaluated and reviewed by the unit team for progression into PHASE III.

The PHASE II portion of the program takes approximately 60 days to complete. PHASE III continues the emphasis on programming by diversifying into anger and violence control forums. The cross-cultural sensitization continues to be taught in practical application through successful inmate-to-inmate interaction. The ability to channel aggressive feelings into positive modes with real resolutions and expectations is explored.

The intended product of PHASE III is a culturally-adapted and socially-appropriate individual, capable of dealing successfully with the pressure of incarceration and gang affiliations. Interactive and interpersonal skills are taught to help inmates live to-

gether without violence. The PHASE III portion of the program can be completed in approximately 90 days.

Through each phase inmate behavior, compliance with programming, and continued gang affiliation or activity is closely monitored. Ultimately, if the inmate is unable to progress through the phases and remains in PHASE I for a period of a year, placement in the more restrictive Assaultive Inmate Management Program is considered. However, most inmates take advantage of the program and finally, upon successful completion of all three phases, and a formal renunciation of gang affiliation are reintegrated into general population at other facilities throughout the state.


Nonetheless, the new generation "convict code" remains strongly articulated along lines of racial and gang affiliation. Prison officials continuously face two main problems: 1) the threat of conflict among gang-oriented and well-entrenched blacks, whites, and Hispanics and, 2) the threat of individual acts of predatory behavior by members of the strongest group against members of the weakest group.

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lifeblood of effective correctional officer performance. This includes the capacity to understand the full range of inmate (verbal and nonverbal) modes of communication: the culture, the slang, the signals, the threat, and the fear that abounds.

The deployment of the correctional officer workforce also has been directly affected by overcrowding. Traditional two-officer duty-post assignments are being altered to one-officer posts. Aggregate duty-post assignments are concentrated in these new congregate housing areas. Towers are being closed and new video surveillance and other security technology is being introduced to augment or replace archaic staffing models. While this new technology represents important innovations, it may also precipitate precarious staff reductions in crucial support service areas. It is in these places – mess halls, corridors, chapels, recreation areas, classrooms, transportation vans, shops, work details, clinics and hospitals – where violence has always been most prevalent. Research and documentation on current institutional violence indicate that incidents are more frequent, more violent, and more planned than previous violence in the last fifty years. Figure 4 profiles the Line of Duty deaths of Correctional Officers, 2000-2003.<sup>14</sup>

**Figure 4:**  
**Correctional Officers Line of Duty Death (Federal & State)**



Source: Correctional Peace Officer Foundation

## Environmental Health

In the past, the occupational tools of the correctional officer consisted of keys, a flashlight, and a body alarm. Today, the officer's occupational tools include latex gloves, plastic cuffs, and a CPR (cardiopulmonary resuscitation) lateral mask. The recurrence of tuberculosis and other contagious airborne diseases has made people think more about proper ventilation

and sanitation in crowded quarters, including occupational health concerns regarding blood pathogens and hepatitis. These concerns have drawn attention to health risks associated with custody situations in closed holding cell areas and transportation vans.

Overcrowding also has increased the likelihood of enforced overtime duty for correctional officers. Excessive overtime or shift rotation potentially drains the physical and psychological well-being of staff and results in overindulgence in smoking and alcohol, poor diet, and the failure to exercise. Correctional officer divorce and suicide rates are inordinately high. These situations easily can lead to a contagious pattern of deep cynicism and depression.

## A Problem Stated Well is a Problem Solved

Unfortunately, many state and local correctional agencies have eliminated full-time internal operational planning and research functions. A viable research function guides an agency in examining both standard and non-standard questions concerning operational integrity and effectiveness: What pressure does the larger criminal justice system place on corrections? What are the correctional policy variables over which public officials have some leverage? What goals underlie the competing theories of corrections? What are the common tensions and pressures affecting all states that make prisons today particularly vulnerable to violence? Do shared problems (such as the aforementioned gang oversight resources) point to shared, or at least generalizable, solutions?

These questions assist in identifying the potential general causes of, and solutions to, institutional violence. A standard set of variables and questions has emerged to help maintain the efficacy of custodial operations and control.

- Overcrowding. How have sentencing practices changed populations? Are there demographic changes that make control of overcrowded prisons more difficult?
- Idleness. What are the opportunities for inmates to occupy themselves (e.g., recreation, education, work) while incarcerated?
- Presence/absence of incentives for good behavior. How is order maintained? Does the prison management have a range of incentives to offer inmates? Can the management maintain control of adjusting those incentives?
- Inmate security. Do the inmates (and staff) feel reasonably safe and protected within the system? Can the management ensure the safety of those who feel threatened and minimize the opportunities for violence?
- Facility Security. Are staffing levels adequate to maintain communication and backup? Is an emergency response plan in place? Are prison security procedures observed?

## Conclusion

The fastest-growing segment of most state budgets is corrections. Correctional services receive more new state dollars than higher education. The ethnic and racial composition of the U.S. prison population points to deep social problems, which correctional agencies increasingly are being asked to solve. Across the nation, state and federal penitentiaries exist as urban



bubbles where city problems are custodially contained. If the city that feeds the prison has gangs on its streets, the prison has gangs on its blocks. If there is rampant drug use, drug dealing, and violence on the outside, these activities will also exist on the inside. Maintaining custody, security, and control in a humane and safe manner is becoming more difficult.

The magnitude of incarceration in the United States today casts a shadow on our larger social infrastructure. This situation raises important questions about the purpose and scope of incarceration: questions that can be answered only by social programs and other resources outside of prisons. The current trend is toward higher security with more sophisticated technology and procedures. Current philosophies and techniques of unit management, direct supervision, and related operational methods for delivering services to inmates will assume even greater industrial proportion. As long as incarceration remains the primary mode of dealing with offenders, U.S. correctional agencies (federal, state, and local) will continue to do what they do best: provide care, custody, and control. 🌐

## Endnotes

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## For More Information

**The Federal Bureau of Prisons** - <http://www.bop.gov>

**U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics and SOURCEBOOK** - Reports the changing nature of criminal justice information as well as the growth of information technology; The web page is <http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/>

Answers to criminal justice-related questions are now available through the Office of Justice Programs' (OJP). The web page is <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/>

**NCJRS Online** - NCJRS is a key Internet source for research and information on criminal justice, juvenile justice, and drug policy. The web page is <http://www.ncjrs.org/>

**U.S. Federal Bureau of Prisons** - Overview of the BOP, including corrections, research, inmate management directives and quick facts; the web page is <http://www.bop.gov/>

**The Corrections Connection** - Includes an information and technology network; the web page is <http://www.corrections.com/index.aspx>

**The New York City Department of Correction** - Includes mission statement, Compstat/Teams, Gang Unit, Correctional Officer workforce information; the web page is <http://www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/doc/home.html>